Evolution might have set the basic foundations for abstract mental representation long ago. Because of language, mental abilities would have reached different degrees of sophistication in mammals and in humans but would be, essentially, of the same nature. Thus, humans and animals might rely on the same basic mechanisms that could be masked in humans by the use of sophisticated strategies. In this paper, monkey and human abilities are compared in a variety of perceptual tasks including visual categorization to assess behavioural similarities and dissimilarities, and to determine the level of abstraction of monkeys' mental representations. The question of how these abstract representations might be encoded in the brain is then addressed. A comparative study of the neural processing underlying abstract cognitive operations in animals and humans might help to understand when abstraction emerged in the phylogenetic scale, and how it increased in complexity.
INTRODUCTION
The belief that human beings are radically different from other animals has its roots in Descartes dualism of mind and body. Descartes regarded animals as unthinking machines that lacked conscious perception. A century later, John Locke determined that the distinction between humans and animals lies in the human capacity for abstraction that is specific to them because of their language ability. Indeed, with language, mental representations of specific ideas or features could be given names independently of their real concrete existence. Thus, abstraction has mainly been studied in humans through verbal categorization and linguistic concepts. However, the ability to group together different objects sharing common features or properties regardless of their physical differences is not restricted to the domain of language. Abstraction might involve the conceptualization of entities that belong to different levels (Saitta & Zucker 2001) . Whereas the highest level of perception seems out of reach for animals because it involves language to describe both the world and theories, the fundamental and intermediate levels of perception and structural organization of the world could rely on concepts that might be accessible to non-linguistic species. Categorization is an economical way of dealing with the millions of bits of information continuously available in the surrounding world. Being able to visually identify a new object as a member of a category whose properties are known (food, predator, prey…) , is an indisputable biological advantage for animals equipped with such abilities. However, the question of whether animals can categorize objects is still controversial. Many authors regard this ability as restricted to humans: 'Unlike any other animal, we have a natural ability to group objects or events into categories' (Hunt 1982 in Herrnstein 1984 , or to anthropoids that had been given access to language (Premack 1983) . But is language really a prerequisite to develop the concept of a class of objects?
Charles Darwin (1871) , with his theory of evolutionary continuity between humans and other animal species, set the reference frame for the study of animal intelligence. He was, indeed, the first to apply evolution not only to physical characteristics but also to minds as he stated 'the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation'. Thus, in mammals and in humans, although mental abilities have reached different degrees of sophistication, they would essentially be of the same nature. To support such phylogenetic continuity, the cognitive scientist is in search of the mental (abstract) operation performed by animals that could be considered as the basic process that has evolved to allow higher-level mental operations in humans. However, billions of years of selection have been so successful that the animal world overflows with examples of what might be thought of as an intelligent behaviour but which need only involve stereotyped responses.
At a time when the behaviourist movement considered learning as the result of simple associations between stimulus and response, without any attempt to enter the 'black box' that they stuck in between, the work of Tolman shook the behaviourist dogma. His studies showed that rats could demonstrate remarkable spatial abilities that could not be explained by the simple stimulusresponse theory (Tolman 1948) . He postulated the existence of 'cognitive maps', attributing new ideas to the rat based on mental processes such as expectations, hypotheses and belief.
This concept of mental representation (Gallistel 1970; Vauclair 1992) has been central to the research on animal cognition. To interact adequately with objects in the surrounding world packed with sensory information, animals have to perceive the world in a flexible way that depends on their desired goals. Moreover, in most cases, they cannot rely solely on sensory information, they have to assess the current situation mentally, using previously memorized experience: they have to manipulate mental representations.
When the neuroscientist tries to tie mental representations and cognitive processes (up to thought or consciousness) with cerebral activity and neuronal mechanisms, the large amount of scientific evidence showing the similarities between human and animal brain functions is in agreement with a continuity between human and animal thought. For a long time investigations in neuroscience have been carried out on anaesthetized animals, but progress in experimental techniques has allowed investigations on awake animals, performing more and more challenging tasks to become the norm. The neuronal mechanisms that underlie higher-order cognitive functions in monkeys can thus be directly addressed.
In § 2, visual categorization and other perceptual tasks will be used as a way to assess abstraction abilities in monkeys and to compare monkey and human behavioural performance in various experimental conditions. In § 3, we will turn towards the neuronal mechanisms that could underlie such abilities and explore the relative role of some brain structures.
VISUAL CATEGORIZATION
Within a category, objects are defined by some of their features whereas others are totally irrelevant. Multiple instances of a category have to be processed to abstract these pertinent features and to allow generalization to exemplars that were never seen before. The field of research on the ability of animals to categorize objects was really opened by the pioneer study of Herrnstein & Loveland (1964) . Their work revealed surprising capacities in pigeons that were able to sort photographs on the basis of whether the image contained a human being. For familiar photographs, such grouping could be achieved by learning all exemplars by rote; and animals (especially birds) can display a large rote memory capacity for visual objects. However, the main point was that pigeons could transfer their categorization ability to photographs that they had never seen before, thus they went further than rote categorization, they showed generalization. Since that time, several other studies have demonstrated that birds are able to classify a wide variety of stimuli, and it is surprising that such abilities were not demonstrated in monkeys until the 1980s. Monkeys can show categorization abilities in the wild: for example, vervet monkeys give alarm calls that depend on which particular predator is present (leopard, eagle or python), provoking a well-adapted escape reaction from the other members of the troop (Seyfarth 1980) . The ability of monkeys to categorize was demonstrated using various classes of objects (Schrier et al. 1984 1988; Roberts & Mazmanian 1988) . However, we still know very little about the mechanisms that underlie categorization in animals and humans. Is categorization based on similar processes in pigeons, monkeys and humans? When did categorization appear in the phylogenetic scale? Did it appear only once? If so, then it presumably came from a very old ancestor as both birds and humans share it. Did it appear independently in different groups of animals? In this case, the categorization abilities of monkeys and humans could rely on the same basic mechanisms whereas birds' categorization would depend upon different ones.
Categorization can be done at different levels of abstraction. At the most concrete level, the similarity between exemplars is very high, for example, when pictures of kingfishers must be grouped together. But a kingfisher can also be categorized as a bird or as an animal, and whereas birds still share many features, the most abstract level (animals) goes well beyond physical similarities. It is hard to describe the features shared by the photograph of a flock of sheep and the close-up of a snake. Considering the hierarchical organization of these levels of object categorization, one can expect generalization to be comparatively easy at the concrete level because of the many visual features shared by various views of different kingfishers. At the highest level, the mental representation that will allow generalization across the high variety of known animals must be highly abstract and generalization should be more difficult. The works by Rosch et al. (1976) and by Jolicoeur et al. (1984) also raised the question of the level at which objects were first categorized. They defined 'a basic category level', or an 'entry category', which is most often found at the intermediate level (e.g. birds) . This hierarchical scale of abstraction was used to study performance in perceptual categorization in a comparative study between squirrel monkeys and humans carried out by Roberts & Mazmanian (1988) . Monkey performance was expected to decrease with increasing abstraction of the concept. In fact, both monkeys and humans performed well at the most abstract level, but whereas the monkeys' biggest difficulties were observed at the basic level (birds among animals), the worst human performance was found at the more concrete level (kingfisher among birds). Whatever the level of categorization, both species could transfer their acquired abilities to new sets of photographs. However, the squirrel monkeys' rate of correct responding with new photographs was not very high at the most abstract level, and they needed bigger training sets for better transfer. This relates to the increased number of exemplars needed for developing a more abstract concept, as suggested earlier.
(a) Fast visual categorization in monkeys and humans In addition, the initial low rate of transfer found for squirrel monkeys at the most abstract level by Roberts and Mazmanian might also be related to specific aspects of their experimental protocol. Monkeys were first trained on a fixed set of photographs and then tested on a completely new set of images. Thus, they were encouraged, in their training phase, to use a strategy based on a stimulusresponse association rather than to develop a strategy relying on the emergence of a real concept. Moreover, as monkeys are very sensitive to reward rate, an initial minor accuracy decrease during the testing session with new photographs might be strengthened by the correlated decrease in reward delivery. In our group, we reinvestigated the ability of monkeys to develop abstract concepts such as 'food objects' or 'animals' by comparing the performance of rhesus macaques (an old world monkey) with those of humans tested in exactly the same conditions. Our protocol differs from that of Roberts and Mazmanian in several ways. In their study, the monkeys were always faced with a pair of stimuli and rewarded when choosing the item of the studied category. In our task, the monkeys are presented with one image at a time, in a random sequence, and must only respond to targets ('go' trials), whereas they have to withdraw their response on non-targets ('no-go' response). Thus, they are rewarded for all correct responses (whether 'go' or 'nogo'), and cannot form categories of objects based on the association with reward. However, the main point is that the performance of macaques on new photographs is assessed every day by mixing new photographs with familiar ones and the analysis is restricted to the monkey's response on the very first presentation of each new photograph. This protocol has several advantages: (i) the animal is faced with new photographs from the very beginning of its training, which renders inefficient a strategy based on stimulus-response association; (ii) because of the stable reward rate obtained on familiar images, the animal is in a stable state of attention and motivation whenever a novel image is presented for the first time; and (iii) it allows a longitudinal study of the monkey's ability to perform with new photographs.
Another important feature of our task is the extreme temporal constraints that were applied to our subjects (both macaques and humans). Stimuli were flashed for only 30 ms and the response had to be given in less than 1 s. Thus, the subjects could not visually explore the stimuli because they had no time for eye movements, they were obliged to rely on very rapid mechanisms and humans could not make any use of time-consuming checking strategies. To obtain a better appreciation of the similarities and dissimilarities between performance in monkeys and humans, they were both tested on identical set-ups using exactly the same varied sets of natural images (figure 1a).
Despite these constraints, monkeys score ca. 90% correct with images they have never seen before (Fabre- Thorpe et al. 1998; Delorme et al. 2000) . This performance has to be compared with a rate of 94% correct for humans-a robust performance first described in the original study that introduced the protocol of fast visual categorization (Thorpe et al. 1996) . However, monkeys are much faster than humans, with a median reaction time in the range of 250-300 ms whereas human median reaction times are usually in the range 350-450 ms.
An interesting fact is the considerable overlap of the photographs that induced errors in both humans and monkeys (figure 1b,c). When photographs were pooled in three different classes (easy, intermediate and difficult images) according to human performance, the monkeys were found to show a similar pattern of success to the human subjects for all three groups of images. The same observation holds for images that induced correct responses but were associated with long reaction times.
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2003) This first result suggests that monkeys and humans make their decisions on the basis of similar cues. If so, performance should be similarly impaired when particular cues are removed or manipulated. Among the various features of an object, colour may be an important one for identifying both food objects and animals. In fact, colour was considered as an important feature for monkeys' decisions by Roberts & Mazmanian (1988) and by D' Amato & Van Sant (1988) . We studied categorization performance of humans and monkeys when coloured and grey level photographs were randomly mixed (figure 1a). The effect of removing colour information was only marginal (although slightly more pronounced for food objects), and the overlap for images that provoked errors in the two species was again substantial for coloured and for grey level images (Delorme et al. 2000) .
The comparison of monkey and human performance showed other intriguing similarities. One interesting question concerned the effect of familiarity on categorization performance. One could wonder whether a monkey that has categorized the same photographs many times would do so on the basis of very low-level cues. However, as subsequently shown for humans (Fabre- Thorpe et al. 2001a ) when performing with familiar images, monkeys are more accurate but do not improve their maximal speed of response. The shortest latency behavioural responses appear at ca. 180 ms in monkeys and 250 ms in humans, regardless of whether the stimuli are new or familiar. This suggests that in this sort of fast visual categorization task, all the computing steps are necessary and none can be by-passed even with familiar photographs. The underlying visual processing is performed, in both monkeys and humans, at optimal speed even when the images are completely new.
However, the speed at which humans and monkeys can perform the animal categorization task is puzzling because it raises the question of the kind of information processing that can be done in such a short delay. In fact, the short latency responses argue against the involvement of timeconsuming complex mechanisms to perform such superordinate categorization tasks. The shortest latency responses even pose a serious challenge to the current models of visual processing, when one considers the pathway through which the information needs to travel from the retina to the hand .
The fact that colour does not play an essential part suggests that the sensory computations necessary to perform the task rely on the first visual information available for processing. Hence, colour information travels along a relatively slow visual pathway (the parvocellular system), and the decision might be taken even before it gains access to mental representations. This idea is strongly supported by new data showing that both humans and monkeys can perform the task with very low contrast grey level pictures (figure 2) that cannot even activate the parvocellular system. Humans and monkeys can still score ca. 70% correct when the initial contrast of the image is divided by a factor of 10 (Fabre- Thorpe et al. 2001b) , and the initial contrast has to be divided by 32 before they both reach chance levels.
An important point to emphasize is that when human subjects perform above chance at low contrast levels, they are typically unable to identify the animal they responded to or even to report why they actually responded. 
(i) (ii) Figure 1 . Two categorization tasks were used, one based on animals versus non-animals (a)(i) and the second based on food objects versus non-food objects (a)(ii). The subjects (rhesus monkeys or humans) were positioned in front of a tactile screen, they started the sequence of photographs by pressing on a button and each picture was flashed in the centre of the screen for ca. 30 ms on a black background. They were given 1 s to release the button and touch the screen when they detected a target (animal or food) in the flashed image, otherwise they had to keep their hand on the button. All correct decisions were rewarded by a beep noise, monkeys were also given a drop of fruit juice. Incorrect decisions were followed by a 3-4 s display of the incorrectly classified stimulus, thus delaying the next trial and the next possibility of reward but also allowing time for ocular exploration. All pictures (a) were natural scenes taken from a large commercial CD database (Corel). Targets and distractors were equiprobable and included both close-ups and general views. Targets were very varied including fishes, birds, mammals and reptiles when the target was an animal, and fruit, vegetables, salads, cakes, biscuits and sweets in the case of food targets. Nontargets included landscapes, trees, flowers, objects, monuments, cars and some images belonging to the other target category. On target trials, the subjects had no a priori knowledge concerning the position, the size or the number of targets in the picture. Moreover, both tasks included targets that were only partly visible, or partly masked in the scene. As illustrated in (a), in some experiments the photographs were randomly shown in colour or in black and white. Examples of scenes that induced incorrect categorization for both human and monkeys are illustrated in (b) for targets and in (c) for distractors.
As suggested by the low contrast experiment, this coarse, achromatic mental representation might not even be accessible consciously. Two other studies that have so Figure 2 . Categorization is robust to a reduction of contrast. Accuracy was ca. 70% when the contrast of the initial black and white image (N) was divided by 10 and only reached chance level when contrast was divided by 32. Numbers in italics correspond to the residual contrast fixed at 100% for the normal condition.
rupts the incoming image information flow after only 10-20 ms (Thorpe et al. 2002) or when the photograph briefly appears in the extreme periphery of their visual field and is thus processed with very low acuity . However, in both cases, even if they can perform the task above chance level, they have great difficulty in reporting consciously what they have seen. The inability of humans to report why they responded in such extreme conditions suggests again that well-adapted behavioural responses can be triggered from abstract mental representations that are not accessible consciously. Animal and human performances have very often been compared in tasks in which humans can apply their sophisticated mental strategies. The briefly flashed stimuli and strong temporal constraints used in the rapid categorization task might have emphasized similarities between monkeys' and humans' visual processing because the visual system is obliged to rely on early information processing. When forced to produce fast responses, humans would be compelled to rely on basic, coarse, extremely fast processes that they might share with monkeys because they are inherited from a common ancestor. In such conditions, humans and monkeys would base their decisions, at least partly, on the same cues and on overlapping abstract representations even if, given more time, humans would be able to improve their accuracy because of more sophisticated strategies.
If humans and monkeys rely on similar information processing one has to explain why monkeys can respond so much faster than human subjects. Although humans seem to favour accuracy whereas monkeys favour speed, this speed-accuracy trade-off is not sufficient, on its own, to explain the difference. In fact, another simple additional explanation could lie in the difference sizes of their brains. Within brain cortical areas, the conduction velocity of axons can be surprisingly low and so it could be that in humans, with their larger brains, information transfer would be more time consuming.
In sum, these results argue for a continuous evolutionary process in which higher cognitive functions progressively develop along the phylogenetic scale. Although fast visual categorization may rely on unconscious representations, this does not set a boundary between humans and animals. Animals might often behave unconsciously but their abstraction abilities are difficult to imagine without any conscious thoughts. Although human consciousness would be more highly complex, the basic question (Griffin Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2003) 2001) is whether the difference between humans and animals is qualitative and absolute or whether animals can experience conscious thoughts that might be more limited and even different from humans, but essentially of the same essence.
(b) Mental images of the visual world in monkeys
In this section, my aim is not to present an exhaustive view of the literature but to provide a few specific examples taken from the literature to illustrate the level of abstraction of monkeys' mental representations.
(i) Mental image of an object: mental image of a class of objects
One key characteristic of mental representations of objects is flexibility. In specific tasks-such as mental rotations tasks-mental representations have to be worked on and manipulated. Monkeys can perform various mental rotation tasks. When trained with images of objects that contain sufficient three-dimensional information to specify the object's structure, they can generalize object recognition to new views generated by any rotation of the target object. However, as for humans, recognition becomes increasingly difficult when stimuli are rotated away from the familiar viewpoint (Vauclair et al. 1993; Logothetis et al. 1994) . Such ability implies that monkeys are mentally able to compare a memorized image with the perceptual representation of a concrete visual stimulus, to modify mentally the orientation of an image and assess its identity with another one. The data also suggest that monkeys and humans could use similar mechanisms.
Vision, however, is not the only sense through which animals and humans can relate to the surrounding world. Because a given object, such as a cat for example, can be recognized through visual, tactile, auditory and olfactory information, mental images must be abstract enough to be accessible through different sensory channels. Crossmodal equivalence is a way to assess experimentally how mental representations can be accessed through different sensory inputs, and has been shown in monkeys. When allowed to explore new objects with their hands and only through this haptic modality, monkeys can subsequently recognize these objects visually (Davenport & Rogers 1970; Weiskrantz & Cowey 1975; Elliot 1977) . This means that the first object representation built from tactile sensory messages can be reactivated through visual information. Thus, the abstraction of mental images is at such a level that it can combine information gathered from different sensory channels and can be accessible through any of them. Such cross-modal interaction is not restricted to the representation of particular objects, it has also been shown for mental representations of concepts. Baboons can categorize photographs on the basis of whether they contain a human being or a monkey, but, like humans, they are faster when primed with a different photograph from the same category. In the task, baboons and humans were shown two different photographs in succession and were required to categorize the second 'test' photograph. Thus, the first 'prime' photograph was irrelevant for the outcome of the task, but the prime and the test photographs could belong either to the same category or to different ones. This experiment showed that both humans and monkeys were faster to categorize the test photograph when it was preceded by a prime that belonged to the same conceptual category. For some baboons, this holds if the prime was presented in colour or in black and white, with or without background. The 'concept' of human or monkey was thus activated by the prime and reactivated faster when the test photograph belonged to the same category. Moreover, facilitation was also observed when cross-modal integration was needed (Martin-Malivel & Fagot 2001) . When baboons and humans performed the categorization task on the basis of vocalizations, brief presentations of human or baboon prime pictures conceptually related to the target sound shortened response times. Cross-modal facilitation shows that categorization in monkeys cannot rely only on perceptual attributes of the stimuli. Like humans, it appears that baboons are able to form amodal abstract concepts.
Such studies suggest that monkeys might be able to make a judgement of conceptual identity. The first demonstration of such abilities in non-human primates was published recently (Bovet & Vauclair 2001 ). When trained with two different object categories (food objects and tools) baboons were asked to judge whether two objects were identical or different. They were able to use this relation not only at the perceptual level (an apple is the same as an apple), but also at the contextual level (an apple is the same as a banana because they are both 'fruit') showing that they can treat two exemplars that are physically very different as belonging to the same given category.
Thus, monkey mental representations are not the pure neuronal images of particular sensory inputs because they can be accessed through different sensory modalities, and can be the site of various computations in order to produce pertinent behavioural responses.
(ii) Numerosity One computation that can be done on mental representations and which has been the subject of considerable controversy is the ability of monkeys to make sense of, and use the numerosity and the ordinal disparity of different visual stimuli. A recent study showed that monkeys could represent the numerosities 1-9 on an ordinal scale. Monkeys trained to order pairs of stimuli in an ascending order with numerosity in the 1-4 range were able to generalize the rule in the transfer phase when faced with new stimuli and novel numerosities from 5 to 9 (Brannon & Terrace 1998) . The monkeys could not rely on any other cues because visual stimuli were controlled for all non-numeriPhil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2003) cal cues such as size, shape and colour. Moreover, in such a task, the level of difficulty can be altered by varying the distance (5 versus 9 compared with 7 versus 8) and the magnitude (5 versus 6 compared with 8 versus 9) of the numbers used. The authors showed that the effect on speed and accuracy of performance was analogous to that observed with human subjects (Moyer & Landauer 1967) .
Monkeys can thus be trained to make use of small numbers but they can also spontaneously use the ordinal position of stimuli within a sequence to perform a task. For example, in a task using 30 stimuli grouped in 10 different triplets, macaques were asked to indicate the order in which the three arbitrary stimuli were successively presented (Orlov et al. 2000) . With such a limited number of possibilities, learning by rote the 10 triplets-using stimulus-response association-would be the most efficient strategy. In fact, the authors showed that the first strategy used by the monkeys was to group stimuli into three categories based on their ordinal positions: the set of stimuli that were always shown first, the set of stimuli that were presented in second position and the set of stimuli that appeared in third position. Although this strategy might not be the most efficient one to start with, the authors demonstrated that it allowed monkeys to generalize spontaneously to new triplets built with the same stimuli.
(iii) Anticipation
Finally, the last point that I would like to illustrate is how these representations might lead the animal to anticipate the results of its actions. When trained in laboratories the obvious motivation of the monkey is the food reward obtained after a correct response. Obviously, it has been shown that the shorter the delay between the correct response and the reward, the faster animals learn, and it is also known that imposing an additional delay between trials is a strong punishment for monkeys. However, can they really anticipate the consequences of their actions? In a recent study (Shidara & Richmond 2002) , macaques were asked to perform a task in which correct responses were not always rewarded. To get a reward, they had to produce one, two or even three correct successive responses. The task has no importance; the essential point is that each stimulus contained a visual feature that was completely irrelevant for deciding what response to make but that was strictly correlated to reward proximity. As correct task performance was unrelated to the processing of this cue, monkeys could have ignored it completely. Instead, they were shown to spontaneously learn to use it to infer reward proximity. They performed with higher error rates when the cue indicated that no reward had to be expected from that trial, an effect that disappeared when the cue was randomly associated to reward proximity.
Thus, monkeys can build abstract mental flexible representations, they can perform various kinds of computation on them, but they can also use them to anticipate the consequences of their actions. We are not that far from Tolman's view of animal mental processes when he talked about expectations, hypotheses and belief.
So far, we have looked at the monkey's behaviour by emphasizing the similarities or dissimilarities with human behaviour in various tasks. The next question, however, concerns the biological substrate of these representations.
When such biological substrates can be studied and compared in humans and monkeys, they give invaluable information on the mechanisms underlying abstract cognitive operations in both species and open the way to study the emergence of abstraction in animals and how it increased in complexity along the phylogenetic scale. Although so far we have very few answers to these questions I would like to focus, in the next section, on the very recent evidence accumulated by neuroscientists on how the monkey's brain can categorize visual stimuli and open this field of research to other abstract operations.
VISUAL CATEGORIZATION IN THE MONKEY'S BRAIN
Even though humans and macaques have evolved independently for the past 30 million years, the macaque visual system is a very good model for the neuroscientist who tries to relate mental representations and neuronal mechanisms (Imbert 1999) . Its anatomy and physiology are well documented and, after anthropoids, it offers the greatest analogies with the human brain.
The information captured by the retina is transmitted to the primary visual cortex (V1) and progresses in the brain along the dorsal and ventral pathways. Object recognition and visual categorization mainly involve the ventral pathway. The complexity with which the visual features are analysed increases progressively at each computational step of the ventral visual pathway up to the AIT. This cortical brain area contains neurons whose responses can be linked to very complex visual stimuli such as faces or other very specific objects (Bruce et al. 1981; Perrett et al. 1982; Logothetis et al. 1995; Booth & Rolls 1998) . These cells can respond to different views of the same object and can in some cases be totally 'view-invariant', reacting to all angles of view of the object (Booth & Rolls 1998) . In a sense, this is a first example of categorization at the single-cell level, as canonical and non-canonical views of the same object are represented by the response of a given cell or population of cells. Neurons can also selectively respond for various exemplars of the same category of objects such as trees or fishes, for example (Vogels 1999) , although no cell has yet been reported that responded to all exemplars of the category. Such data support the idea that visual categorization might rely on multiple prototypes-each one allowing a given range of generalization. A category of object could be represented by the activity of a neuron assembly; each neuron coding overlapping sets of exemplars. The neuronal substrate for visual categorization might thus be located in the AIT cortex. In humans, medial temporal neuronal responses have been shown, as for monkeys, to be selective for faces, but also for natural scenes, houses, famous people and animals (Kreiman et al. 2000) and damage to the fusiform gyrus (which might be partly homologous to the AIT in monkeys) induces impairments in face or object visual identification or categorization.
In a recent study (Sheinberg & Logothetis 2001 ), monkeys had to pull a lever on the left or on the right depending on the object that was hidden in a natural scene. The target objects were complex, including, for example, a cup, a butterfly, a bird, etc. Selective infero-temporal cells remained silent while exploring the scene but responded strongly when the monkey spotted the object for which they were specific. However, a very important point is that none of the cells showed a specificity for the group of objects that required either a left or a right response. Thus, the specificity of AIT neurons does not appear to be linked, in any obvious way, with the behavioural outcome. The infero-temporal cortex may provide highly processed visual information concerning the visual objects that are present, but may not support multimodal representation and does not appear to be involved in defining the category borders that are pertinent for particular motor responses. To set the adequate category borders for visual stimuli, AIT could play an interactive part (figure 3) with another brain area: the PFC Hasegawa & Miyashita 2002) . In a recent study, Freedman et al. (2001) trained monkeys to categorize cats from dogs and recorded in the PFC. They then analysed how the monkeys and the PFC neurons would behave when faced with stimuli obtained by morphing dog and cat basic forms from one to the other. Monkeys were accurate even when stimuli were close to the border (e.g. 60% dog and 40% cat or vice versa) but most interestingly, the selective response of PFC neurons to a given category exemplar had the same strength regardless of how close it was to the other category. Thus, PFC neurons could reflect an abstract representation of category membership, irrespective of how prototypical the exemplar is, and would define the category boundaries in relation to the behavioural consequences. The numerous reciprocal connections between PFC and AIT cortex (figure 3) could allow the necessary interactions to select the best diagnostic features of the stimuli (Hasegawa & Miyashita 2002) . In fact, the feature sensitivity of AIT neurons can be shaped to enhance the representation of the stimuli characteristics that are pertinent in a given categorization task (Sigala & Logothetis 2002) .
This area of research is developing quickly and most of the above results have been obtained in the past 5 years. Neurophysiologists working with primates are seeking to understand how abstract concepts are encoded in neurons and neuron assemblies. This is not only true for categorization, the foundations of mathematics have recently been tackled using single recording in monkeys (Nieder et al. 2002) , pointing towards the role of a parieto-frontal circuit. As the involvement of these brain structures in simple arithmetic has been shown in humans, and has some support in cats, the conceptual foundations of arithmetic might have been laid down long ago by evolution (Dehaene 2002) . In sum, and regardless of the concept studied, the experimental studies argue for their progressive emergence with evolution.
The technique of using single unit recordings, however, also has its limits. It has often been used in animals with the obvious assumption that the data could be extrapolated to humans, and even if the few results obtained with intracranial electrodes in humans are in accordance, they are obtained from patients, and will (hopefully) remain relatively anecdotal. The response might come with the blooming of brain studies using the functional imagery by magnetic resonance. Mainly used in humans up to now, it has been applied very recently to monkeys performing cognitive tasks; we are thus at the dawn of a new area during which we will be able to compare the brain areas activated in humans and monkeys solving the same abstract problems. Such an approach should provide a way to bridge our knowledge acquired at different levels of integration (single cell, brain structures, brain circuits) and document the biological support of abstract concepts that underlie cognition in animals and humans. They might also allow us to determine the point at which the language abilities specific to humans become necessary to push back the limits of abstraction.
